

EXPOSE YOURSELF WITHOUT INSECURITY

BSIDES ATLANTA 2020



INTRO DO YOU KNOW YOUR EXPOSURE?

HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHAT IS EXPOSED TO THE INTERNET IN YOUR **CLOUD ENVIRONMENT?**



WHO ARE WE?



BRANDON GAUDET
Senior Security Analyst



OSCAR SALAZAR
Principal Researcher

- >>> Focused on Continuous Attack Surface Testing (CAST)
 - Techniques
 - Procedures
 - Tools
- >>> Continuously learning new techniques for offensive testing



INVENTORY SUCCESS CRITERIA

What do we want from our asset inventory? (i.e. Targets):

UPDATED ENDPOINTS

Through continuous and frequent analysis

2

ACCURACY

Through curation of multiple data sources (external & internal)

3

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

Through maintained visibility (metadata & screenshots)



OPERATIONALIZE IMPACT OF EXPOSURES



TARGETS METHODOLOGY

BUILDING A BASELINE







- Business Units
- Products
- Services
- Mergers & Acquisitions





- Subdomains
- IP Address Space
- Active Services
- ASNs



 Continuously updated dataset of DNS and IP based Targets



MORE SUCCESSFUL APPROACH

- >> Master records are your advantage as defenders
- >>> Emulate real-attackers but where possible, be several steps ahead of them
- >> Our goal is to inventory the entire attack surface, we should utilize all the things:
 - Domain registrars
 - DNS records
 - Certificate Authorities
 - BGP Prefix

- Internet Scan Archives
- Cloud account metadata
- ...and anything and everything attackers and your internal IT uses





02 METHODOLOGY

USING DIFFERENT LENSES **INSIDE LOOKING OUT** OUTSIDE LOOKING IN



USING DIFFERENT LENSES

INSIDE LOOKING OUT (IT/ENG Configurations)

- When and where possible, always leverage the master records
- Go to the source of truth
- Someone at your organization has to setup and maintain a configuration for each asset and systematically there is evidence of this system in your master DNS records and router tables (e.g. DHCP)




OUTSIDE LOOKING IN (OSINT)

- Shadow IT will always exist
- Use techniques from outside your environment to see what the rest of the world can see
- Attackers scan the internet, they monitor for changes to internet infrastructure, and can mine massive datasets using OSINT to find what they're looking for, i.e. a weakness
- Adopt similar approaches. whois data, registrar data, reverse DNS



ATTACK SURFACE MAPPING



3/28/20

HOW DO YOU IDENTIFY CLOUD ACCOUNTS

- >> Follow the money \$\$\$
- >> Partner with finance to monitor corporate credit card usage
- >> Whose corporate credit card is accruing charges from AWS, Azure, GCP, etc? this is your best lead to identify unknown accounts.
- >> Establish review process and track security team visibility into these accounts
- >>> BEWARE of laaS/PaaS/SaaS that mask popular providers (e.g. refinery.io) and hide inventory

\$736.43 paid on December 3, 2019

Thanks for using Refinery, we appreciate your business! Please email billing@refinerylabs.io with any questions or issues regarding this invoice.

Description	Qty	Unit price	Amount
Managed API Gateway	1	\$1.13	\$1.13
Managed Athena	1	\$0.02	\$0.02
Managed Lambda	1	\$687.48	\$687.48
Managed Simple Notification Service	1	\$0.02	\$0.02
Managed Simple Queue Service	1	\$2.62	\$2.62
Managed CloudWatch	1	\$4.82	\$4.82
Managed CodeBuild	1	\$0.06	\$0.06
Managed Simple Storage Service	1	\$40.28	\$40.28

WHY NOT ADD ONE MORE AWS ACCOUNT?

- Security team should have an account
- One account to read them all from a monitoring perspective
- Establish a parent org account with engineering

Assume role access or Security Auditor read-only access to all other accounts identified at the organization



ACCOUNT ACCESS ESTABLISHED*

- >> Which accounts have publicly facing systems and services?
- >> How are those specific services externally accessible? (DNS/IP/Port)
- >> Access Levels:
 - Internal
 - AWS Resource Relationships (IAM Access Analyzer helps here)
 - Internet

^{*} Assuming you identified all accounts established a program and a policy to detect future accounts and have executed access controls properly.



IMPACTFUL EXPOSURES

OPERATIONALIZING DATA

- >> Publicly available services should have:
 - Scheme/Protocol
 - Host (DNS or IP)
 - Port
 - URI (relative path)
 - Anonymous internet-facing access



- >> Internet scale scanners will find these services
 - May not route correctly for AWS services and error without DNS/VHOST info






O3 STATE OF THE ART

AVAILABLE TOOLS & TECHNIQUES

AWS IN 2011 WHAT SERVICES DO WE NEED TO CONSIDER?



AWS IN 2017 WHAT SERVICES DO WE NEED TO CONSIDER?

Compute

Amazon EC2

Amazon Elastic Container Service

Amazon Elastic Container Service for

Kubernetes

Amazon Elastic Container Registry

Amazon Lightsail

AWS Batch

AWS Elastic Beanstalk

AWS Fargate

AWS Lambda

AWS Serverless Application Repository

Auto Scaling

Elastic Load Balancing

VMware Cloud on AWS

Storage

Amazon Simple Storage Service (53)

Amazon Elastic Block Storage (EBS)

Amazon Elastic File System (EFS)

Amazon Glacier

AWS Storage Gateway

AWS Snowball

AWS Snowball Edge

Acres and the second second

AWS Snowmobile

Database

Amazon Aurora

Amazon RDS

Amazon DynamoDB

Amazon ElastiCache

Amazon Redshift

Amazon Neptune

AWS Database Migration Service

Migration

AWS Migration Hub

AWS Application Discovery Service

AWS Database Migration Service

AWS Server Minration Service

Networking & Content Delivery

Amazon VPC

Amazon CloudFront

Amazon Route 53

Amazon API Gateway

AWS Direct Connect

Elastic Load Balancing

Developer Tools

AWS CodeStar

AWS CodeCommit

AWS CodeBulld

AWS CodeDeploy

AWS CodePipeline

AWS Cloud9

AWS X-Ray

AWS Tools & SDKs

Management Tools

Amazon CloudWatch

AWS CloudFormation

AWS CloudTrail

AWS Config

AWS OpsWorks

AWS Service Catalog

.....

AWS Systems Manager

AWS Trusted Advisor

AWS Personal Health Dashboard

AWS Command Line Interface

AWS Management Console

AW5 Managed Services

Media Services

Amazon Elastic Transcoder

Amazon Kinesis Video Streams

AWS Elemental MediaConvert

AWS Elemental MediaLive

AWS Elemental MediaPackage

AWS Elemental MediaStore

Machine Learning

Amazon SageMaker

Amazon Comprehend

Amazon Lex

Amazon Polly

Amazon Rekognition

Amazon Machine Learning

Amazon Translate

Amazon Transcribé

AW5 DeepLens

AWS Deep Learning AMIs

ent o beep bearing and

Apache MXNet on AWS

TensorFlow on AWS

Analytics

Amazon Athena

Amazon EMR

Amazon CloudSearch

Amazon Elasticsearch Service

Amazon Kinesis

Amazon Redshift

Amazon QuickSight

Ambeum Quicksign

AWS Data Pipeline

AWS Glue

Security, Identity & Compliance

AWS Identity and Access Management

.

Amazon Cloud Directory

Amazon Cognito

Amazon GuardDuty

Amazon Inspector

Amazon Macie AWS Certificate Manager

AWS CloudHSM

AWS Directory Service

AWS Key Management Service

AWS Organizations

AW5 Single Sign-On

AME CHILLS

AR & VR

Amazon Sumerian

Application Integration

Amazon MO

Amazon Simple Queue Service (SQS)

Amazon Simple Natification Service (SNS)

AWS AppSync

AWS Step Functions

Customer Engagement

Amazon Connect

Amazon Pinpoint

Amazon Simple Email Service (SES)

Business Productivity

Alexa for Business

Amazon Chime

Amazon WorkDocs

Amazon WorkMail

Desktop & App Streaming

Amazon WorkSpaces

Amazon AppStream 2.0

Internet of Things

AWS loT Core

Amazon FreeRTOS

AWS Greengrass

AWS Int 1-Click

AWS InT Analytics

AWS IoT Button AWS IoT Device Defender

AWS IoT Device Management

Game Development

Amazon GameLift


Amazon Lumberyard

Software

7-

PACE OF INNOVATION

AWS Features & Services





AWS IN 2020

WHAT SERVICES DO WE NEED TO CONSIDER?





SES



AMI





CloudWat... DB on Ins...



HDFS Clu... Amazon E... Route 53 ... MySQL D...



Elastic IP

Instance ... Amazon E...RDS DB I...





Red:





ElastiCach... ElastiCach... Elast









S3 Bucket



S3 Objects





Python 23











S3 Bucket...

EBS Snap... EBS Volu... Glacier Ar... Glacier V...







EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART

What was already available when we tried to solve this problem?

- Cloudmapper
 - https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/06/13/cloudmapper_public/
 - https://github.com/duo-labs/cloudmapper
- AWS Public IPs
 - https://github.com/arkadiyt/aws_public_ips
- IAM Access Analyzer (codename Tiros released at Re:Invent 2019)
 - July 2019 https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-security-profile-john-backes-senior-software-development-engineer/
 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/what-is-access-analyzer.html
 - https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/Security/Reachability Analysis for AWS-based Networks.pdf
- Cartography
 - https://github.com/lyft/cartography



LIMITATION OF AVAILABLE TOOLS

EXPOSED SERVICES: STATE OF THE ART

	CLOUDMAPPER	AWS PUBLIC IPS	IAM ACCESS ANALYZER	CARTOGRAPHY
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS	Yes	No	No	Yes
IP ADDRESSES	Yes, but IPv6 not supported	IPv4 – IPv6 Classic / VPC networking	No	No
PORTS	TCP, UDP	No	No	Yes
PROTOCOLS	No	No	No	Yes
NETWORK ACL RULES	No	No	No	Yes
AWS SERVICES COVERED	EC2 – ELBs – RDS	EC2 - ELBs - RDS - RDC APIGateway, CloudFront, ElasticSearch, Lightsail Redshift	S3 IAM roles	EC2 - ELBs - S3 ElasticSearch
COMPREHENSIVE	No	No	No	No



04 OUR FIRST PASS


Identify Common Patterns

AWS EXPOSURE ENDPOINTS

- APIs-Guru OpenAPI Directory
 - Wikipedia for Web APIs. Directory of REST API definitions in OpenAPI 2.0/3.0 format
- >>> Identified patterns in AWS Service DNS records from documentation

https://github.com/APIs-guru/openapi-directory/tree/master/APIs/amazonaws.com

>>> Cross referenced with passive DNS data to understand real-world usage





AWS EXPOSURE PATTERNS

Beware of misconfigurations that expose your content with these CNAME patterns:

s3	https://{user_provided}.s3.amazonaws.com
cloudfront	https://{random_id}.cloudfront.net
ec2	ec2-{ip-seperated}.compute-1.amazonaws.com
es	https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.es.amazonaws.com
elb	http://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:80 https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:443
elbv2	https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com
rds	mysql://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:3306 postgres://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:5432
route53	{user-specified}




AWS EXPOSURE PATTERNS

Beware of misconfigurations that expose your content with these CNAME patterns:

execute-api	https://{random_id}.execute-api.{region}.amazonaws.com/{user_provided}
cloudsearch	https://doc-{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.cloudsearch.amazonaws.com
transfer	sftp://s-{random_id}.server.transfer.{region}.amazonaws.com
iot	mqtt://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:8883 https://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:8443 https://{random_id}.iot.{region}.amazonaws.com:443
mq	https://b-{random_id}-{1,2}.mq.{region}.amazonaws.com:8162 ssl://b-{random_id}-{1,2}.mq.{region}.amazonaws.com:61617
kafka	b-{1,2,3,4}.{user_provided}.{random_id}.c{1,2}.kafka.{region}.amazonaws.com {user_provided}.{random_id}.c{1,2}.kafka.useast-1.amazonaws.com
cloud9	https://{random_id}.vfs.cloud9.{region}.amazonaws.com
mediastore	https://{random_id}.data.mediastore.{region}.amazonaws.com.
kinesisvideo	https://{random_id}.kinesisvideo.{region}.amazonaws.com
mediaconvert	https://{random_id}.mediaconvert.{region}.amazonaws.com
mediapackage	https://{random_id}.mediapackage.{region}.amazonaws.com/in/v1/{random_id}/channel




DOMAINS > IP ADDRESSES



AWS ELASTICSEARCH EXPOSED INDICES

- Found 59 exposed instances
- Found 1706 multi-MB exposed indices



```
> GET / cat/indices?v HTTP/1.1
> Host: search-nw-public-uo66a REDACTED :127qx2pqbwblky.us-east-1.es.amazonaws.com
> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; meg/0.2; +https://github.com/tomnom/meg)
< HTTP/1.1 200 0K
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
< Content-Length: 1130
                                                        pri rep docs.count docs.deleted store.size
health status index
                                 uuid
                                M2G5eFJATU2AF8iXUNicuA
yellow open
                                                                     53793
                                                                                             39.3ml
              rus voter rec
              .kibana
                                PtAmgYIiRYaU mZUiTTXRg
green open
                                                                                             40.1k
                                0rjQz60JS0ihg-rv23eX4g
yellow open
              admin
                                                                                              8.9kl
              events2016
                                vXJ5FSzzQ5SyQq-K5HWe0q
                                                                    136000
                                                                                             87.5ml
yellow open
yellow open
              data catalog test x4i-yWkURiuYDx2ja7lIFw
                                                                                            112.7kl
                                8GLpSf7PQaeSHGbkDYg3eA
                                                                                            115.3kl
yellow open
                                                                        51
              test
                                ZgzicZp4Qv6lwEuNR0J1wQ
                                                                                            110.9kl
yellow open
              data catalog
                                                                        51
                                 tJUsdiHoSya0CKfov-JzxQ
yellow open
              events2018
                                                                   6325000
                                                                                              3.8gl
yellow open
              events2017
                                 WduAnZZqSP0cUM9u7J81cq
                                                                    137000
                                                                                             88.3ml
https://search-fittingroom-g REDACTED big5ztfwmyzsij5xnm.eu-west-1.es.amazonaws.com/_cat/indices?v
```


Note: This was a sample of us-east-1 and not comprehensive analysis of exposures across all regions

AWS ELASTICSEARCH

EXPOSED INDICES

- Found 59 exposed instances
- Found 1706 multi-MB exposed indices
- IPv4 scanners cannot find this

```
dig search-its-6tvhicibj REDACTED | llgogw7mm5g.us-east-1.es.amazonaws.com
 <<>> DiG 9.10.6 <<>> search-its-6tvhicibj REDACTED | lgogw7mm5g.us-east-1.es.amazonaws.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
  ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 46484
;; flags: gr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
 EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1452
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;search-its-6tvhicibj REDACTED | lqoqw7mm5q.us-east-1.es.amazonaws.com. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
search-its-6tvhicibj REDACTED $lqogw7mm5q.us-east-1.es.amazonaws.com. 60 IN A 52.1.68.147
search-its-6tvhicibj REDACTED #lgogw7mm5g.us-east-1.es.amazonaws.com. 60 IN A 3.223.42.5
;; Query time: 75 msec
  SERVER: 1.1.1.1#53(1.1.1.1)
;; WHEN: Thu Jan 16 15:55:22 EST 2020
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 125
```




User is not authorized to perform this action

Note: This was a sample of us-east-1 and not comprehensive analysis of exposures across all regions

AWS MEDIASTORE

SAMSUNG TV PLUS


- Found Samsung TV Plus streams
 - Samsung TV Plus delivers free TV.
 Get instant access to news, sports, entertainment, and more. No download, additional device, or credit card needed.



Note: Samsung TV Plus is only available on 2016 - 2019 Samsung Smart TV's in select territories and an internet connection is required.

SAMSUNG TV PLUS

- Found Samsung TV Plus streams
 - Samsung TV Plus delivers free TV.
 Get instant access to news, sports, entertainment, and more. No download, additional device, or credit card needed.
- IPv4 scanners cannot find this



Note: Samsung TV Plus is only available on 2016 - 2019 Samsung Smart TV's in select territories and an internet connection is required.



05 OUR SOLUTION

YET ANOTHER TOOL

Introducing Smog Identifying The Cloud That No One Wants

https://github.com/BishopFox/smogcloud

Smog Cloud

Find cloud assets that no one wants exposed

AWS Patterns

These are the patterns of exposure URIs that you may find in your AWS accounts

- · s3
 - https://{user_provided}.s3.amazonaws.com
- · cloudfront
 - https://{random_id}.cloudfront.net
- ec2
 - ec2-{ip-seperated}.compute-1.amazonaws.com
- es
 - https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.es.amazonaws.com
- · elb
 - http://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:80
 - https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com:443
- · elbv2
 - https://{user_provided}-{random_id}.{region}.elb.amazonaws.com
- · rds
 - mysql://(user_provided).{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:3306
 - o postgres://{user_provided}.{random_id}.{region}.rds.amazonaws.com:5432




AWS EXPOSURE ENDPOINTS

Identified patterns in aws-cli example documentation

https://github.com/aws/aws-cli/tree/develop/awscli/examples

- >> Cross referenced identified patterns with aws-cli commands data to identify access patterns
- >> Bucket accessible data into correct format
 - Hostname
 - URIs
 - IPs





AWS EXPOSURE ENDPOINTS

- >>> Identified 288 endpoints across 62 services that return a Hostname, URI, or IP
- >> Manually reviewed 14 services to determine the endpoints that provide publicly facing resources
- >>> Implemented extractors for 14 services in smogcloud tool

